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Abstract. This paper tackles the broad issue of contract incompleteness, property rights and conflicts in the 
context of rural Côte d'Ivoire. Since the beginning of the 2000s, a new type of contractual arrangement is 
developing rapidly: the "Plant & Share" contract. The central principle of this type of arrangement is that the 
landowner (usually an autochthon) provides the land to a farmer (usually a migrant) who develops a perennial 
tree crop plantation, i.e., supplies the seedlings, the fertilizers and the labor until production starts. When the 
plantation starts to produce, three types of sharing arrangements (usually by half, exceptionally 1/3 for the 
landowner and 2/3 for the farmer) occur, depending on what is shared: (i) the plantation (the landowner retaining 
his/her ownership right to the land bearing the farmer's part of the plantation); (ii) the plantation and the land 
(i.e., thru the contract, the farmer builds an ownership right not only on the plantation, but also on the land 
bearing his share of the plantation); (iii) the production (the land remaining the property of the landowner and 
the plantation being de facto co-owned by the assignor and the taker). Like most institutional arrangements in 
rural Côte d'Ivoire, P&S contracts remain usually "informal" in the sense that there is no legal validation of the 
transaction by a public authority. Beyond their "informal" nature, P&S contracts are quite incomplete. Some 
elements of the arrangement are rarely or never specified explicitly: the length of the contract, the right to 
transfer the plantation, the technical process involved in the creation of the plantation, etc. In their current form, 
P&S contracts therefore convey a real potential for conflicts between landowners and farmers. The aim of the 
paper is to provide insights into the rationale for the rapid spread of this new institutional arrangement. Its 
incompleteness is discussed as well as its potentially conflictive features. The paper also shows how this 
contract, in spite of its incompleteness, constitutes an alternative to much more conflictive land "sales" that 
currently dominate the land transfers market in the country. A discussion of the socio-political embeddedness of 
contractual practices is thus provided. Aside from the authors' long time field research investment in Côte 
d'Ivoire, the paper draws on data coming from two sources: a survey realized by F. Ruf in 2001 (600 farms), and 
a survey realized by J.-Ph. Colin in 2008 (269 farms). 
"To increase our economic understanding of contracts, it is 
necessary to get one's hands dirty and discover how particular 
contracts actually work in practice." Benjamin Klein (2002) 
Introduction 
There is a growing interest among institutional economists for agrarian contracts and land markets in 
developing countries. As a contribution to this budding field we propose a qualitative analysis of a 
new contractual arrangement in rural Côte d'Ivoire, the "Plant and Share" contract. Through such a 
contract, a settler gains access to long-term use rights, or even to ownership rights on land, by 
establishing a perennial plantation on an assignor's land in exchange for rights on part of this 
plantation. The paper focuses on the radical "incompleteness" of such contracts, linking it with 
property rights and conflict issues.  
This type of institutional arrangement has been described in Togo (Antheaume, 1982; Gu-Konou, 
1986) and Ghana (Hill, 1956; Amanor & Diderutuah, 2001)2. In Côte d'Ivoire, the first cases of P&S 
were observed at the beginning of the 80s in Centre-West and South-West regions (Ruf, 1982; De 
Fina, 1995; Koné, 2001; Léonard & Balac, 2005), and in the 90s in the South-East (Koffi, 1999). 
Recent research highlights a dramatic extension of P&S (Ruf, 2001; Colin, 2008a). Ruf's survey was 
realized in 2001 in 5 sites of Southern Côte d'Ivoire, on a sample of 600 farms. Colin's study was 
realized in 2008-2009 on 10 sites of Southern Côte d'Ivoire, on a sample of 269 farms; it also included 
interviews of state representatives (préfets, sous-préfets and directeurs départementaux of the Ministry 
of Agriculture). Even if these studies did not specifically focus on this type of contract, they provide 
                                                 
1 We wish to thank our colleague Jean Daudelin for constructive comments on a preliminary draft. 
2 Such arrangements are also know in France, with the bail à complant for vineyard (with a first mention in the 
10th century), or in Indonesia for cocoa (Ruf & Yoddang, 2004). 
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material for a first analysis of this type of institutional arrangement and open avenues for future 
investigation1. On the basis of that material, the paper aims to provide insights into the rationale for the 
rapid spread of this new institutional arrangement and to discuss its incompleteness as well as its 
potentially conflictive features. Through an analysis of the socio-political embeddedness of contractual 
practices, the paper also shows how the P&S contract, in spite of its incompleteness, constitutes an 
appealing alternative to the much more conflictive "sale" contracts that currently dominate the land 
market in the country.   
The paper is organized as follows. A first section offers some key points regarding the Ivorian context. 
The second section describes the P&S contracts – underlining their incompleteness, identifies the 
actors they typically involve, and proposes a tentative interpretation of their current rapid spread. A 
third section deals with the actual or potential conflictuality of P&S arrangements. The following 
section offers a discussion of the P&S arrangements as incomplete contracts. The conclusion sheds 
some light on why, despite their incompleteness and significant conflict potential, P&S contracts as 
alternative to sales are viewed by the actors as an institutional innovation that might reduce inter-
ethnic conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire. 
1 The Ivorian context2 
The smallholder coffee and cocoa plantation economy in Southern Côte d’Ivoire3 developed in 
sparsely populated areas and its rapid expansion since the beginning of the 20th century can be 
explained by the mass influx of migrants coming from regions which were ecologically unsuited to 
coffee and cocoa, such as the savannas of the center and northern Côte d'Ivoire, Upper Volta (now 
Burkina Faso), and Mali. The relationships between autochthons and migrants (Ivorian or foreigner) 
thus fundamentally structures the land issue in Southern Côte d'Ivoire. 
The initial land access of those migrants was placed within a broader process of integration into the 
community, by way of of "tutorat", a type of tutorship relationship (Chauveau, 2006). Through this 
traditional patronage relationship, an autochthon4 granted land rights5 (on uncleared forest taken from 
the village or lineage land "reserve") to a migrant, according to a principle of moral economy, namely, 
that all individuals should get access to the resources necessary for their subsistence. The migrant, in 
turn, had a "duty of gratitude" towards his tutor, expressed through everyday civilities and gift offers 
after harvest and on important social occasions, such as funerals.  
The deepening and increasing monetarization of the migrant's "duty of gratitude" then led to the 
development of informal land sales, with the land transfer maintaining, at least in the transferors' mind, 
a strong relational dimension6 (Colin & Ayouz, 2006). Latter on, new institutional arrangements 
governing the migrants' access to land have emerged, including fixed leases, sharecropping, and 
recently, "Plant and Share" contracts (P&S). 
                                                 
1 Due to the studies design, the quantitative data presented in this text should not be considered as statistically 
representative of the situation in Southern Côte d'Ivoire, but rather as indicators regarding P&S contracts. 
Ongoing and future research should allow to deepen the study according to the lines defined in this paper, and 
also to produce quantitative representative data. Data coming from Ruf (2001) appear as "2001Survey", those 
coming from Colin (2008a) as "2008 Survey ". 
2 This section draws heavily on Colin & Ayouz (2006) regarding the analysis of land "sales". 
3 Southern Côte d'Ivoire corresponds to "la zone forestière" (the forested area) in French, i.e. to the Southern half 
of the country in an agro-ecological environment favorable for coffee and cocoa plantations. Today most of the 
forest has been substituted by these plantations. 
4 Autochthons designate the native people in a given region. 
5 The tutorat relationship only concerns long-term transfers of administration rights, especially for coffee or 
cocoa plantation development. It does not concern renting, sharecropping and other short or middle-term 
transfers of land use rights. 
6 It is still common practice for the seller to seek favors from the purchaser a long time after the transaction has 
been concluded, such as requests for loans (where repayment is far from guaranteed) or contributions at times of 
significant expenditure (such as funerals and medical care). In other words, the fact that money intervenes in the 
land transfer does not result in a final, definitive, and indisputable sale. Payment does not bring an end to the 
relationship; it often establishes or perpetuates it. 
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Until the Rural Land Law of 1998 was adopted, private property rights legally applied 
only to registered land (a tiny proportion of national territory), while unregistered land 
(almost all arable land) was constitutionally the property of the state, albeit with 
recognition of customary tenure on a personal and non-transferable basis. The aim of the 
1998 Land Law is to facilitate a transition towards individualized rights to private 
property (individual freehold tenure). The law, passed unanimously in a context of strong 
politicization and ethnicization of the land question, stipulates that foreigners cannot own 
land in Côte d'Ivoire. The foreigners who acquired land in the past are supposed to have 
their use rights protected by long-term lease contracts over land titled in the name of the 
autochthon (or his heir) who gave or "sold" the land. It must be emphasized that, as a 
result of the socio-political crisis in the country, the new law has yet to be implemented. 
The monetarization of the settler's "duty of gratitude" through land "sales" should not be confused with 
the emergence of perfect market transactions. First of all, the actual contents of the transferred rights 
often gave rise to conflicting interpretations: was it a purchase of the land or a purchase of the right to 
plant tree crops, with an expiration date implicitly determined by the lifespan of the plantation? Was 
the buyer acquiring all the transfer rights? Secondly, the social embedding of transactions through the 
institution of tutorat frequently renders the sale incomplete, thereby not fully releasing the purchaser 
from all obligations towards the seller. In other words, the fact that money intervenes in the land 
transfer does not imply a final, definitive, and indisputable sale. Payment does not bring an end to the 
relationship; it often establishes or perpetuates it (Colin & Ayouz, 2006; Chauveau & Colin, 
forthcoming).  
The massive development of land "sales" has to be put in the perspective of unbalanced public 
regulation of the relationships between autochthons and settlers. Under the Houphouët Boigny regime, 
the colonial regime's tendency to favor migrants' over indigenous claims was maintained, especially 
with the presidential slogan "the land belongs to those who make it productive" and the stance of the 
prefectoral administration to radically consolidate the immigrants' position (the Baoules – Houphouët 
Boigny's ethic group – in particular, but also the Voltaics) vis-à-vis autochthonous attempts to collect 
land rents. In certain contexts (particularly in the South-West), the fact that the autochthons were 
completely submerged demographically by the wave of migrants also contributed to the multiplication 
of those "sales" (Schwartz 1979; Léonard and Balac 2005). The risk for autochthons to lose all control 
over uncleared land without compensation resulted in an increase in monetary land transfers in the 
Mid-West and South-West regions, which largely opened up to the plantation economy at that time. 
Holding back forest reserves for future needs became a risky strategy (Ruf 1988; Chauveau 2000). By 
"selling" forest to migrants, the autochthons could attempt to secure some immediate profit, but also to 
enforce their status of tutor, with the expected advantages (Dozon, 1985). The trend was so massive 
that there was no room for a contract more favorable to the autochthons. 
Through the institution of tutorat, migrants who gained access to the land by "purchasing" forest 
remained – or should have remained, in the view of the autochthons – under obligation to the 
autochthons who granted them access. However, it is widely documented that purchasers – in 
particular those from Côte d'Ivoire – tended (at least until the 2002 civil war) to reject any obligation 
towards the seller and to claim ownership of the land. Thus, for decades, the relationship between 
purchasers (or purchasers' heirs) and sellers (or sellers' heirs) has often been fraught with tensions, 
leading sometimes to open conflicts (Amon d'Aby, 1960; Raulin, 1957; Chauveau & Richard, 1977; 
Ruf 1988). Depleted land reserves and the economic crisis have exacerbated the conflicts surrounding 
past transactions, in particular with the return of "town-dwelling" autochthons (unemployed or school 
drop-outs) to their villages of origin, and with young autochthons who face great difficulties in gaining 
access to land blaming their elders for having squandered the family's land patrimony. These conflicts 
can occur a long time after the initial transaction, in particular during the passing of generations in the 
seller's family group, as young family members challenge past transfers and refuse to be bound by the 
arrangements concluded by the previous generation. To the extent that the transactions have brought 
together immigrant purchasers (nationals or not) and autochthon sellers, these conflicts take on a 
strong political dimension, and are considered by analysts as one of the factors explaining the civil war 
that broke out in 2002. 
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2 The rise of Plant & Share contracts in Côte d'Ivoire 
2.1 A dynamic trend 
According to the 2001 study, 8% of the interviewed farmers were involved in a P&S contract on at 
least one of their plots. In the 2008 study, that proportion reached 19 % of farmers. Yet, the relative 
importance of P&S arrangements varies widely between and within regions. The contract remains 
unknown in some villages and is widespread in others, involving for instance 20 % of the area and 40 
% of the farmers in Damé, in Agni country. 
Even if the results of the 2001 and 2008 surveys are not representative of Southern Côte d'Ivoire and 
cannot be directly compared because of different sampling procedures, they reveal the relative 
importance of P&S in different regions and its progression in the 2000s. 
Table 1. Relative importance of Plant & Share contracts 
 2001Survey 2008 Survey 
Region Number of planters 
Number of planters 
having assigned or taken 
a plot under P&S 
contract 
%  Number of planters 
Number of planters 
having assigned or 
taken a plot under P&S 
contract 
%  
Lower Coast - - - 34 1 3 % 
South-East 97 18 18,6 % 67 27 40,3 % 
Centre - - - 12 0 0 % 
Centre-West 219 16 7,3 % 69 11 15,9 % 
West - - - 27 1 3,7 % 
South-West 284 13 4,6 % 60 11 18,3 % 
Total 600 47 7,8 % 269 51 19 % 
Even if the overall importance of P&S remains modest, these surveys point to a dynamic that started in 
the 80s and has strengthen enormously since the beginning of the 2000s (Figures 1 & 2): according to 
the 2008 survey, 5 % of the plots under P&S (2.2 % of the area under P&S arrangements) have been 
planted in the 80s, 12.3 % in the 90s (11.4 % of the area), and 83.3 % in the 2000s (86.3 % of the area)  
Figure 1 Evolution of the adoption of Plant & Share contract, 1980-2001 (2001 survey) 
Adoption du Planter-Partager en Côte d'Ivoire. 1980-2001
(Prise ou cession d'une parcelle)
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Figure 2 Evolution of the number of plots and area under Plant & Share contracts (2008 survey) 
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008 survey, most plantations under P&S contracts are cocoa plantations (Table 2).  
Table 2. Crops under Plant & Share contracts (2008 survey) 
 Area Number of plots 
Cocoa 303.9 ha (72.6 %) 92 (80.7 %) 
Hevea 112 ha (26.8 %) 20 (17.5 %) 
Oil palm tree 2 ha (0.5 %)  1 (0.9 %) 
Cashew tree 0.5 ha (0.1 %) 1 (0.9 %) 
Total 418.4 ha (100%) 114 (100%) 
This data, however, te the u  plantations under P&S, 
marginal here, are often m ntioned in the Lower Coast (Akindes & Kouam , 2001). 
olders, or in a few cases between smallholders and 
rial enterprises developing hevea or oil palm tree 
"purchase" or gift 26 %. None of the foreign settlers assigned land under P&S 
• 
Peo  0 ha, 
com r
                                                
underestima se of this type of contract: oil palm
e é
2.2 The actors of Plant & Share contracts 
Our surveys captured P&S contracts among smallh
extensionists (encadreurs) working for agro-indust
cultivation, and taking advantage of their relation in the villages to develop their own business. The 
planters as well as the State representatives interviewed also mentioned the frequent case of cadres 1 
who take land under P&S contracts in order to develop hevea plantations (we interviewed a group of 
such cadres)2. Agro-industrial enterprises are also starting to use this institutional arrangement3.  
The 2008 survey shows a clear dichotomy between autochthons as assignors and Ivorian or foreign 
migrants as takers: 
• Autochthons assigned 74 % of the plots under P&S contracts, Ivorian settlers who got access 
to land by 
contracts (even if many of them control land that they "purchased" or were given), 
Foreign settlers take 51 % of the plots, Ivorian settlers 44 %, and autochthons only 5 %. 
ple assigning land under P&S contracts are usually well endowed, with a median area of 2
pa ed to 9 ha for the landowners who do not assign land under such arrangements. 
 
1 In Côte d'Ivoire, "cadres" designates people living in urban areas, most often in Abidjan, and in stable 
employment, particularly as executives in public institutions or private companies. 
2 These past years hevea cultivation has been expanding dramatically, leading to a real "hevea feaver" (Ruf, 
2008) among peasant smallholders as well as among cadres.  
3 As an example, the AgroElite firm started the plantation of 1,380 ha of hevea in the département of Dabou, 
with one third of the planted area that should go to the landowners (Notre Voie, 12/1/2008). 
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2.3 The different Plant & Share configurations1 
2.3.1 Three types of Plant & Share contracts 
The general principle of a P&S arrangement is that the landowner, called here the assignor, provides 
the land to a farmer, here the taker, who develops a perennial tree crop plantation (cocoa, hevea, oil 
palm tree), supplying the seedlings, the fertilizers and the labor until production starts (from 3 to 6 
years depending on the crop)2. 
When the plantation starts to produce, three types of sharing arrangements occur, depending on what 
is shared:  
• Plantation sharing, which is the dominant arrangement: the plantation is shared between the 
taker and the assignor, for the lifetime of the trees. The assignor retains his/her ownership 
right to the land bearing the taker's share of the plantation. The taker therefore holds a right 
over his share of the plantation, not over the land that bears it. Once the plantation is divided 
up, each one runs his part of the plantation independently.  
• Plantation and land sharing: when the plantation starts to produce, the takers' share is made up 
not only of part of the plantation, but also of the land that bears it. Through the contract, the 
taker therefore acquires an ownership right on the land itself. 
• Production sharing: what is shared is not the plantation (or the plantation and the land), but the 
production itself. The taker runs the whole plantation for the lifetime of the trees, giving the 
assignor a share of the production. The land thus remains the property of the assignor. The 
ownership of the plantation, however, is less clear (see infra). 
Table 3. The importance of the different types of P&S contracts (2008 survey) 
 Plantation sharing 
 Only the plantation Plantation and land Production sharing 
Area 339.9 ha (81.2 %) 13.5 ha (3.2 %) 65 ha (15.5 %) 
Number of plots 92 (80.7 %) 3 (2.6 %) 19 (16.7 %) 
Two focal points organize the sharing between the assignor and the taker: 
• Half-and-half division dominates plantation sharing (90 % of the plots) as well as production 
sharing (75 % of the plots). 
• One-third (assignor) / two-thirds (taker)3 division is less frequent (9 % of the plots under 
plantation-sharing arrangements, 19 % of the plots under production-sharing arrangements).  
Cocoa plantation are shared by half (98 % of the plots); hevea or oil palm plantations are also usually 
shared by half (64 % of the plots), but may also be shared under the one-third/two-thirds principle (36 
% of the plots).  
Most often, the plantation- or production-sharing contract is valid for "as long as the plantation 
produces", with the understanding that the taker should not renew it progressively without the 
assignor's agreement. When the contract duration is (exceptionally) specified, it varies from 50 to 70 
years for hevea, from 25 to 70 years for cocoa, and from 25 to 30 years for oil palm plantations. 
In one of the sites investigated (Damé, in Agni country in South-East), the person taking a plot with a 
P&S contract also has to give some cash money to the assignor ("for the drink") at the time the 
                                                 
1 This section draws on the 2008 survey. 
2 The land is the only assignor's contribution in 101 contracts over 114 for which we got information. When 
there is a contribution from the assignor, it remains modest: some machetes and files, exceptionally cocoa 
seedlings, some fertilizer or agro-chemicals.  
3 The taker is then in a symmetric relation to the landowner when compared with the situation of a laborer paid 
with a share of the product (aboussan). The aboussan (one-third sharing) contract is traditionally used as a form 
of labor contract in producing cocoa plantations (with no responsibility in terms of plantation management). On 
plantations producing low yields or in context of higher pressure on the labor market, the share can rise to one-
half (abougnon contract). Hence, whereas the aboussan receives one-third of the product, the taker under a P&S 
contract retains two-third of it. 
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arrangement is made. This payment, most often relative to the size of the plot, varies around a local 
"standard" of Fcfa 30.000 to 40.000 Fcfa1 per hectare.  
Sometimes, once the plantation is shared, the assignor offers the taker to continue working his share 
with an aboussan contract, "in order to prevent the landowner’s part of the plantation from turning 
back into bush."   
2.3.2 Incomplete contracts 
In any P&S contract, there is no ambiguity regarding the taker’s commitment to establish a plantation 
of a given tree crop on the assignor’s land and to maintain it until it starts to produce. The fact that the 
plantation, the land (exceptionally) or the production will then be shared according to a predefined 
percentage is also explicit2. However, several major elements of incompleteness can be identified. 
From the actors’ perspective, the most significant areas of incompleteness regard the content of the 
property rights, the identity of the rights holders, and the taker’s duties. Specifically, there is 
uncertainty about:  
• The right of the assignor to assign the plot to the taker, in a context where property rights on 
land are not formalized, with the attendent risk of a challenge to the P&S contract by a third 
party.  
• The taker’s bundle of rights, in the plantation-sharing configuration3 – especially the right to 
sell or mortgage his share of the plantation, and the right to transfer the plantation through 
inheritance or inter vivos gift. For instance, the fact that these points are never made explicit 
generates uncertainty regarding the taker’s right to continue running the plantation if the 
assignor dies (risk of the taker’s right being contested by the assignor’s heir), or uncertainty 
regarding the taker’s heir to continue running the plantation if the taker dies (risk of the right 
of the taker’s heir being contested by the assignor). When questioned about their perception of 
the taker’s transfer rights, the actors generally consider that the right on the plantation created 
by the taker can be transmitted through inheritance (92.5 % of the interviewed, without 
significant difference between takers and assignors). However, selling the plantation is 
contemplated only in 40 % of the cases (without distinction between takers and assignors). 
• The taker’s "duty of gratitude" which is not specified in the contractual arrangement (written 
or oral). We saw that the land transfers between autochthons and migrants usually occur 
through a tutorship implying a "duty of gratitude" of the migrant. In the case of P&S contracts, 
one often finds this duty expected by the assignors and recognized by the takers4.  
"He has to help me from time to time, and if I have problems." (Agni landowner, assignor of land 
with a P&S contract in Damé) 5. 
"He is my tutor, if he runs into trouble I have to help him, I can’t run away." (Burkinabè taking 
land with a P&S contract, Damé). 
The fact that it is not made explicit is in line with a tutorship relation (it would be quite out of 
place to do otherwise), but the point is that many tensions come from tutors' perception of 
migrants' ungratefulness if they don't "do enough." The concern to maintain a personal 
relationship with the taker explains why some assignors condition the transmission of the taker's 
                                                 
1 1 Fcfa = 0.00153 €, around 0.0012 US $. 
2 We did interview some planters who were already working a plot of land without a clear specification of what 
will be shared. As stated by this Senoufo school teacher assigned in Ménéké (South-West) and who had started 
creating a plantation: "We have not make this explicit but I guess that it will be the plantation only and not the 
land that will be shared".  
3 In the case of the production-sharing configuration, the property right of the assignor on the plantation is not 
made explicit by the actors but seems to be a matter of a shared understanding of co-ownership (see infra). 
Future investigations should allow exploring more explicitly this crucial issue.  
4 In our survey, it is mentioned in 59 % of the transactions (50 % of the assignors, 85 % of the takers). 
5 The excerpts from interviews quoted in the text come as mere illustrations of positions noted in numerous 
interviews with same or close formulations. 
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plantation through inheritance to their acceptance, or exclude the sale of the plantation by the 
taker:  
"He may mortgage or inherit his share of the plantation, but he cannot sell it, because my 
relations with the buyer wouldn’t be the same as with him. With him, if I lost someone in the 
family, he can say ‘my patron is into trouble’ and come help me." (Bété landowner, assignor of 
land with a P&S contract, Doboua). 
Other potential clauses of the arrangement that are only exceptionally made explicit include the 
conditions under which the plantation is to be established, the specific conditions of the sharing, and 
the duration of the contract:  
• The technical process of establishing and maintaining the plantation until its sharing, for 
instance choice of the seedlings (hybrid or not), fertilization, etc. The only specification 
typically made is the prohibition of cassava as a food crop that might be associated with the 
young plantation1. 
• The timing of the planting, once the taker gets access to land. 
• The possibility or not, for the assignor, to cultivate food crops in the young plantation, or to 
get a part of the taker’s food production on the plantation (or of its value, if it is marketed). 
• The concrete conditions of the sharing of the plantation: when to share it (while the norm 
"when the production starts" is explicit, how to define this start is not), who will delineate 
each one’s share?  
• What happens to the contract if the plantation is accidentally destroyed (especially in case of 
fire). 
• The contract's duration, i.e. when the taker will have to turn the land back to the assignor. The 
shared principle is that the taker retains his share of the plantation (or the right to harvest it, in 
the case of production-sharing P&S) "as long as the plantation produces", but here again 
contracts lack clear criteria of what is a plantation which "no longer produces." 
2.3.3 Property rights structure and decision making in Plant & Share contracts 
The three configurations of P&S contracts lead to distinct property rights structures. A key element of 
this structure is the dissociation, or not, of rights to land and rights to the plantation (on trees). 
• In a plantation and land sharing P&S contract, there is no dissociation in the land and trees 
ownership rights. Once the sharing is realized, the taker operates as the owner-manager of his 
share, with a cost of land acquisition corresponding to the cost of establishing the assignor’s 
share of the plantation. His (informal) property right on land bears of course the uncertainty 
that prevails in all land acquisitions by migrants in Côte d’Ivoire.   
• In a plantation-sharing P&S contract, there is a clear split, for the taker's plot, between 
property right on land (kept by the assignor) and on the trees (held by the taker) – even if 
many of these rights remain unspecified, especially regarding transfer. The cost of establishing 
the assignor’s share of the plantation can be interpreted as a land rent paid in kind and at once 
by the taker, for the use of the land bearing his own share of the plantation.  
• In a production-sharing P&S contract, there is also dissociation of rights, but less clear: the 
land remains indisputably the property of the assignor. However the residual rights claimant 
over the plantation is not explicitly identified. The empirical elements we have suggest that 
there is co-ownership of the plantation between the assignor and the taker. A strong indicator 
is that the income to be earned at the time of clearing the oil palm plantations under P&S 
                                                 
1 The first years of the plantation of the perennial crop, it is usual to associate food crops: the intercropping 
optimizes the use of land and saves on labor investments in the maintenance of trees.  
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contracts is understood by all actors, without any doubt, to be shared between the assignor and 
the taker, in the same proportion as the production beforehand1.  
The taker’s situation can therefore be characterized as follows: the plantation and land sharing P&S 
contract corresponds to a full ownership of land and plantation; the plantation-sharing P&S contract 
combines full ownership on plantation and long-term land tenancy; the production-sharing P&S 
contract corresponds to a co-ownership of the plantation. 
The P&S contract could be interpreted as a form of sharecropping, sharing being at the core of these 
two types of institutional arrangements.  
• The convergence between P&S and sharecropping is neat regarding production-sharing P&S – 
the difference with more usual forms of sharecropping lying in the fact that the taker himself 
produces the biological capital (the plantation) that he later exploits.  
• The convergence is less evident in the case of plantation-sharing P&S, if sharecropping is 
defined (according to the usage) as a form of land tenancy in which the payment for the use of 
land, the rent, is a percentage of the output obtained in the crop season. Here the level of the 
rent does not vary with the production, as the rent paid at once corresponds to the cost of 
creating the assignor’s share of the plantation.  
• P&S contracts including the sharing of the plantation and of the land wanders even further 
away from sharecropping, as this arrangement leads to a transfer of property rights in land. 
Whatever the type of P&S contract, the taker controls decision making regarding the establishment of 
the plantation and, in the case of production sharing, regarding its management. In this latter case, the 
taker cannot be assimilated to a simple laborer. 
The following table sums up the main features of the different configurations of P&S contracts, once 
the sharing realized and considering the taker’s position. It also includes the comparative cases of 
owner-cultivation and of tenancy for non-perennial crops (in these cases, the taker with a P&S contract 
is considered as a potential wage laborer or tenant).  
Table 4. Property rights and decision making in P&S, owner-cultivation and tenancy situations 
Plant & Share arrangements Tenancy 
 Production 
sharing 
Plantation 
sharing 
Plantation 
and land 
sharing 
Owner-
cultivation Fixed-lease 
Share-
cropping 
Taker's status share-partner 
long-term 
tenant 
owner-
operator 
laborer (may 
be a share-
worker: 
aboussan or 
abougnon) 
tenant share tenant 
land  A A T A A A Ownership 
plantation A & T T T A - - 
Decision making regarding production T T T A A T(A) 
labor T T T T T T 
monetary cost : creation 
plantation T T T A - - Inputs provider 
monetary cost : 
production  T T T T T T(A) 
Taker’s share 1/2 or 2/3 product 
1/2 or 2/3 
plantation 
1/2 or 2/3 
plantation + 
land 
If share-
worker: 1/3 or 
1/2 production 
- 1/2 or 2/3 product 
T: taker; A: assignor (landowner) 
                                                 
1 In West-Africa, oil palm trees are used not only to make oil with their fruits, but also, once the trees have been 
cut down, to produce palm wine with the sap and, after distillation, a strong alcohol called koutoukou in Côte 
d’Ivoire. 
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2.4 The rationale for P&S arrangements in the context of Côte d'Ivoire  
Deciphering the rationale of the recent popularity of P&S contracts in Côte d’Ivoire would require a 
full paper. Here, we limit ourselves to a few major issues that enable us to sketch a basic interpretation 
of this development.  
The rise of P&S contracts in the 2000s has to do with the dynamic play of cash constraints and access 
to land and labor in Southern Côte d'Ivoire, but it can also be traced to socio-political factors although 
not directly to legal changes affecting land tenure. The perspective of implementation of the 1998 Law 
(which excludes foreigners from land ownership) can indeed be ruled out as a significant determinant 
of the rise of P&S contracts, as its content is largely ignored in the countryside. 
P&S contracts as alternatives to land sale. In the context of very tense relationships between 
autochthons and settlers induced by the former's perception of having being dispossessed of their land, 
the emergence of P&S (in the plantation-sharing and production-sharing configurations) clearly 
appears as an alternative to sales that allows the autochthon landowners to overcome the constraints 
they face (see infra) without loosing their land rights. This becomes crucial in the context of growing 
land scarcity, but also where the previous "selling off of forest" to strangers is vehemently denounced 
by autochthonous youth and cadres. To the economic dimension is thus added a socio-political 
dimension. From East to West in Southern Côte d'Ivoire, a relation is systematically and positively 
established by autochthons as well as by settlers, sous-préfets or agents of the Ministry of agriculture, 
between the rise of P&S contracts and the reduction, or the a perspective of a reduction, of land sales.  
"The landowner won't be any longer destitute. Because with land sales, the landowner becomes like a 
beggar. With Plant-and-Share, he will always have land to maintain his family" (Guéré, Zro). 
"To buy a land is the root of conflicts. People do not any longer want that here. Plant-and-Share is good 
for both. You have for you, he has for him. He eats, you eats. So we think it is a good contract" (Kroumen, 
Ménéké). 
"Everybody knows that we should not any longer sale the forest. So the Plant-and-Share option is the 
fashionable one: you have one, I have one; you have two, I have two. The Plant-and-Share option is the 
best, except if you are too greedy regarding money [if you want immediate cash]. I think that this option 
will prevail on the others" (Kroumen, Ménéké). 
Considering the current price of land, P&S contract is also a good deal for a landowner. In constant 
Fcfa, the price of land has decreased since the 70s, at least up to 2005. This evolution can be related to 
the unfavorable evolution of cocoa prices (Ruf & Agkpo, 2008). 
Figure 3. Evolution of land price, Fcfa per hectare (2008 survey) 
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A landowner who would try to finance the creation of a cocoa plantation by selling part of his land 
would have to sell more than three hectares to plant one hectare, whereas by assigning land under a 
P&S contract, he delegates a long-term use right on one or two hectares in order and gets one hectare 
planted while keeping the ownership of the land – planting one hectare of cocoa requires around 400 
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working days until the production starts, i.e. Fcfa 480.000, and Fcfa 25.000 for inputs, whereas the 
price of land is around Fcfa 150.000 F/ha.  
P&S contracts as alternatives to land purchase. Considering these figures, it seems that the takers 
would have interest to buy land. However, the comparison between buying or taking in P&S and 
investing one own’s labor cannot consider the same figures, because of the issue of labor valorization 
in the actors' perspective. The cost of creating a cocoa plantation corresponds mainly to labor cost, and 
actors tend at under-valorizing their own labor (i.e., do not valorize it at the opportunity cost on the 
labor market) and at over-valorizing cash1. Settlers may also accept or propose P&S contracts because 
they lack cash to buy land. On a different and fundamental register, they may enter into such an 
arrangement above all because they face the autochthons' growing reluctance to sell land, and because 
they consider this arrangement as the best device to avoid autochthons' acrimonies when, some years 
after the sale, they see their former land bearing productive plantations. Reducing assignors' 
frustrations means reducing future risks of conflict and eviction… As stated by a group of  Ivorian 
cadres who took land under a P&S contract: "Why didn't we rather buy land? Because later there are 
too-much problems, there is a risk of bitterness and of palavers when production starts." Settlers who 
suffered violent eviction during the recent crisis are particularly sensitive to that point. Another related 
element is that in a context of high socio-political instability, some migrants prefer to reduce the risk 
of loosing the cash investment that would represent the purchase of land; in the case of a P&S contract 
for a cocoa plantation, the migrants would "only" loose their own work if they are chased away by the 
autochthons. 
P&S contracts as a response to labor constraint among autochthonous landowners. In the whole 
Southern Côte d'Ivoire, autochthonous landowners face a structural restriction on family labor, 
because most of them are old and have sent their children to school, or they have been to school and 
do not engage directly in agricultural production. Migrants, on the other hand, benefit from their 
access to the pool of labor of their native villages and show, as many migrant populations do, a strong 
productive dynamism. The history of the smallholder plantation economy in Côte d’Ivoire is the 
history of migrants’ quest for land and of autochthons’ quest for labor. In that context, P&S contracts 
are appealing to autochthonous landowners, because it saves them the labor investment involved in the 
establishment of a plantation. 
Financing constraint and credit market failure. The financing constraint comes from the unfavorable 
evolution of agricultural product prices (especially of cocoa) and the lack of a formal credit system2. 
P&S arrangements allow landowners who cannot develop independently their land to get new 
plantations: "if I don't have sufficient resources, I give land to the one who does…." (Chief of village 
of K.) The constraint bears first on the financing of labor, especially for autochthonous landowners. It 
also bears on the financing of inputs, especially regarding hevea and oil palm plantations. The 
dynamic of diversification of the smallholder plantation economy with these crops is therefore one of 
the factors explaining the emergence of P&S contracts, with arrangements between landowners and 
cadres, extensionists, etc. The combination of the cash constraint and of a low land price makes very 
attractive P&S contracts for landowners. The financing constraint also bears on migrants, restricting 
their possibility to buy land and therefore making P&S arrangements attractive.  
Transaction costs on the labor market. From the landowners' perspective, P&S contracts save not 
only on labor costs, but also on search and monitoring costs that would be incurred on the labor 
market. Since the 2000s, the Ivorian rural economy – first and foremost the autochthonous landowners 
– faces a general restriction on labor supply, especially regarding permanent labor that can be 
mobilized in the creation of new plantations3. In a context where it is not easy to find labor and to keep 
it, the ability of P&S contracts to attract and  "anchor" labor reduces search costs. These contracts also 
                                                 
1 On this point, see Thaler (1991). 
2 Informal credit rates rise up to 100% a year. 
3 One usually distinguishes, in Côte d’Ivoire, the following types of labor contracts: permanent laborers (mainly 
paid on an annual basis), temporary laborers (paid on a daily basis or piecework) and laborers employed on 
perennial plantations for their maintenance and harvest, paid with part of the production (aboussan, abougnon). 
Permanent laborers are the ones usually employed for the creation of new plantations, as employing temporary 
labor is much more costly, and aboussan or abougnon only work on plantation that are already producing.  
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reduce monitoring ones, as the perspective of getting half or two-thirds of the plantation constitutes a 
strong incentive for the taker.    
P&S contracts versus wage labor. In the takers' perspective and compared to wage labor, P&S 
contracts are seen as a way to get a better and more secure income, and to build a patrimony (at least 
in terms of use rights) that will be transferred to their children.   
Technical know-how. In the case of oil palm and above all hevea plantations, another component of 
the landowners’ incentive structure is that though a P&S contract, they can get a plantation already in 
production for a crop they have most often never cultivated themselves. In such a case, the 
complementarity between the assignor and the taker is organized on the basis of land on one side, and 
labor, financing and know-how on the other.  
All these advantages of P&S contracts for landowners are accentuated when they are not living locally 
but in town a –situation made increasingly frequent by the succession of generations.  
Avoiding the risk incurred in the creation of a plantation. For landowners – and especially those 
without a strong involvement in agricultural production – P&S contracts remove the risk incurred in 
the creation of a plantation. In case of failure, they get the land back, without having to compensate 
the taker (see infra). 
The cognitive dimension of institutional innovation. Information regarding this new contractual 
relationships and its interest for the landowners is spreading in Southern Côte d'Ivoire. As for any 
innovation, its diffusion comes hand in hand with the circulation of information and imitation. As 
stated by a Yacouba who settled in Guéré country, "In the region of Bloléquin, they are already doing 
that. Here, it is not yet developed, but the idea is starting to mature. One guy already started, it is 
launched." 
A rentier rationale. A major explanation of the dramatic rise of P&S contracts is the fact that such an 
arrangement neatly fits the rentier strategy of numerous landowners, especially in the Western part of 
Southern Côte d'Ivoire, where there is no strong tradition of agricultural production. With such a 
contract, landowners get a plantation in production that they can then entrust to aboussan laborers and 
thus be a "planter" without any real personal involvement in the production. 
The following table sums up the main factors that explain the choice, in terms de governance device, 
between one the one hand, assigning land under a P&S contract, selling land (in order to get cash to 
create a plantation) or directly use the land with wage labor (assignor’s perspective), and on the other 
hand, taking land with a P&S contract or working as laborer or buying land (taker’s perspective)1. 
Table 5. Main factors influencing the choice to enter a P&S arrangement 
Assignor’s perspective 
P&S rather than 
owner-manager 
Offsetts credit market failure and lack of savings. 
Limits transaction costs on the labor market (search and monitoring costs). 
Avoids the risk incurred in the creation of a plantation. 
Offsets a lack of technical know-how (oil palm and hevea)  
Fits perfectly with a rentier rationale 
P&S rather than 
land sale Allows to keep the ownership right on land, reduces intra-family conflicts induced by land sales. 
Taker’s perspective 
P&S rather than 
wage labor 
Much better income. 
Allows the constitution of a patrimony in the guise of a plantation. 
P&S rather than 
land purchase 
Offsetts credit market failure and the lack of savings. 
Reduces the risk of conflicts with autochthons induced by land transfers. 
Avoids the risk of loosing a cash investment, in case of land grabbing by autochthons. 
Offsets the drop in land supply on the sale market.  
                                                 
1 These alternatives do not consider long-term leases which might allow growing perennial crops, as this type of 
contract is currently unknown in Ivorian smallholder plantation economy. It is supposed to be introduced at the 
time the 1998 land law will be applied, as this law provides for such contract in order to secure the use rights of 
the foreigners who will not be allowed to get a land title (see supra). 
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3 Plant & Share contracts as locus of conflicts1 
Tensions or conflicts were mentioned in 6 % of the plots under P&S arrangements. This is not a 
particularly high incidence contractual difficulties, but most contracts are recent andall interviewees 
consider that there are risks of conflict in the future. The survey also identified some contractual 
devices that were implemented in order to prevent conflicts. 
3.1 Tensions and conflicts induces by uncertainty regarding the rights of the assignor 
and of the taker 
"Fraudulent" assignation of land. The first risk of conflicts mentioned by all actors (takers as 
assignors) is the fraudulent assignation of land to a taker by a "false assignor" – most often a young 
member of the family owning the land. 
The landowner’s relatives disputing the contract. The questioning of the transaction by a member of 
the assignor’s family is also seen as a major risk. We did not document direct cases but this problem 
(largely encountered regarding land "sales")  is mentioned in all sites (including by the agents of the 
Ministry of Agriculture), with the highest intensity in the Centre-West and South-West regions, where 
relations between autochthons and migrants are very tense.  
Being chased away by the assignor. Another recurrent takers’ fear in the Centre-West and South-
West regions is the risk of being abusively chased away as soon as the plantation starts producing. 
Questioning the contract after the death of one of the actors. As for other types of land transfer 
(sales, gifts), contestation is feared in the case of the death of the assignor (his heir denouncing the 
P&S contract) or of the taker (the assignor questioning the rights of the taker’s heir). The conflict may 
lead to a full rejection of the contract, or to a contestation of the limits between each one plantation. 
Assignors’ fear of a contestation of their ownership right on land. A symmetric grievance expressed 
by the assignors is the risk that the taker may take advantage of their death to take over the land 
bearing his part of the plantation, arguing that he had bought it. 
3.2 Tensions and conflicts induced by the conditions of establisment and sharing of the 
plantation 
Even if P&S contracts never specify the technical process involved in the establishment of the 
plantation, the actors do not see this as a notable source of conflict. This can be related to strategies 
employed by the assignors to reduce the risk of insufficient investment by the taker, in terms of quality 
or timing; we will come back to these strategies. 
The mode of plantation-sharing is often denounced by the takers, who argue that the assignors always 
choose the best part of the plantation.  In the case of production-sharing, the problem most often 
mentioned is the diversion of production by the taker, which normally leads to a sharing of the 
plantation, each party then running his share. 
"With the yomientchê [name for P&S contract in Agni country], they were sharing the product. But there 
was no trust, the guy [the taker] was not clear. We are not in the bush but someone told us that the guy 
was harvesting more than what he presented us. So my brother got angry and he decided to share the 
plantation." (Agni, Damé) 
From the assignors’ perspective, the risk of opportunistic behavior on the part of the taker’s at harvest 
time is indeed a major factor in the choice between plantation-sharing or production-sharing contracts. 
"Sharing the product is better because they [the takers] work well; they have more strength than we have. 
However, you need to trust them because they might swindle. If there is no trust, or if you want to 
cultivate directly yourself, then you share the plantation." (Agni assignor, Damé) 
Another potentially conflictive issue relates to the food crops initially associated with the plantation. 
The usual perception is that the landowner has no right to use the land for food-crop production 
without the agreement of the taker – as stated by a Baoulé taker in Aniassué, "otherwise, we would 
                                                 
1 This section draws on the 2008 survey. 
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come to blows." In the terms of a Bété from Doboua who assigns land under a P&S contract, the fact 
that he would use the land to grow food crops without the agreement of the taker "would create a lack 
of trust between us and curb his enthusiasm for work." Tensions on this issue are more often 
mentioned in Bété and Kroumen countries, where relationships between autochthons and migrants are 
very tense. As mentionned during a meeting with Bété notables in Doboua: 
"Here there is an opposition regarding the sharing or not of the food production. In the landowner’s 
mind, all the production coming from the plot has to be shared, whereas the taker thinks that only the 
perennial crops will be divided up, and that he can plant food crops for his own consumption or even to 
sell them. Some of the takers are chased out because of that."  
This problem directly relates to the fact that P&S arrangements are relatively new and are not yet 
stabilized though locally shared conventions. 
3.3 Contract duration  
The P&S contract is usually concluded "when the plantation dies." When one discusses with the actors 
what this means precisely, the answers give a glimpse of possible diverging interpretations (linked or 
not to opportunistic behavior) and thus, when the contract reaches its end, for potential disputes 
between the taker, who might want to continue exploiting the plantation, and the assignor who would 
like to get the land back: 
"The contract ends when the production is too much reduced", "If before it was 10-15 bags and now it is 
1 or 2 bags, he has to give me back my land", "When the trees die, when the plantation turns into bush", 
"If before it was 10.000 cacao trees and now it does not reach 1.000 trees, that means the plantation is 
dead." 
The implicit or explicit principle is that there will be an easy convergence in the actor’s appreciation 
("If we both see that we don’t earn any longer"). 
Some landowners express the fear (largely anticipated as these contracts are just at their beginning) 
that the taker might prolong excessively the length of the contract – a fear that can be related to the 
fact that numerous landowners almost never visit the plantation: 
"As long as there are cocoa trees, you harvest! Even if it is in 20 years or 30 years, if there is still cocoa, 
it is for you. Now if there is no any longer cocoa, I get my land back. But there are some [takers], when 
they will see that cocoa trees are weakening, they will start renewing the plantation little by little. They 
are not stupid, they will put new seedlings and so they will be here until who knows when!" (Agni 
assigning land under a P&S contract, Damé). 
3.4 The limits of the "informal formalization" 
In the Ivorian rural context, a legal formalization of the contracts is made impossible by the lack of 
legal recognition of land rights. The presence of witnesses when the arrangement is concluded is the 
most common securization device (97 % of the contracts). In addition, the formalization of the 
contract with "informal written receipts" locally designated as papier (paper) constitutes an almost 
systematic non-legal securization device1: 73 % of the contracts have been the object of such a 
papier2. However, formalizing the contract in such a way does not reduce the different sources of 
incompleteness, for three main reasons. 
• Landowners usually postpone the issuance of the paper until the time of the sharing of the 
plantation3.   
• Only a small fraction of these papiers (16 %) are "validated" by some authority (village chief, 
sous-préfecture, local services of the Ministry of Agriculture1). Moreover, the intervention of 
                                                 
1 These papiers are increasingly used to secure also land purchases and, much less frequently, land leases (Koné 
& Chauveau, 1998; Lavigne Delville, 2003; Colin, 2004; Colin & Bignebat, 2009). 
2 Compared to 78 % of purchase contracts and 4 % of short-term tenancy contracts (2008 survey). 
3 The taker bears the cost of these papiers (from some thousands to some tenth-thousands of francs): money 
given to the witnesses, to the village chief; transportation cost of the witnesses; cost charged by the agents of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, etc. 
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an authority does not give the paper a legal value: formally, the sous-préfecture only 
authenticates the signatures and does not validate the contract as such. Nevertheless the actors 
see these "stamped papers" as elements of proof that they might bring (often with success) in 
case of litigation, including before the local administration or a court2. 
• Lastly and not least, these papers remain largely incomplete. They usually mention the 
identity of the parties, the name of the witnesses, the crop to plant and the area that each one 
will get or the percentage of production that will be shared. On the other hand, they do not 
specify the modalities of creation of the plantation, the planning of the planting, the specific 
mode of plantation-sharing or the transfer rights of the taker. The duration of the contract, if 
mentioned at all, is usually "until the plantation dies." And no paper mentions the taker’s 
"duty of gratitude." 
As a matter of fact, these papiers aim much more at securing the existence as such of the contract, 
than at explicating and making enforceable their clauses. The following examples illustrate the lack of 
specification of most papiers3.  
Box 1. A Plant & Share papier (Tabou) 
Mr. T.N. recognizes that he gave forest to Mr. N. (19 ha), 13 ha pour the taker and 6 for the assignor.  
Signature of the assignor  Signature of the village chief  Signature of a notable 
Box 2. A Plant & Share papier (Tabou) 
Transfer of forest 
Mister T.K., President of the youth of X., recognizes having given ten hectares (10) of forest to Mister S.Y. 
We agreed that the 10 hectares will be planted by Mister S.Y., who, when the production will start, will share 
equitably the ten hectares between Mr. T.K. and him, that is to say that each one share will be 5 hectares. 
                                                                                                                                   X, the 11/20/2007 
Donor’s signature [sic]        Taker’s signature 
 
Donor’s witness:         Taker’s witness 
The village chief, T.L.       S.B.  
The Chef de terre K.H.       D.N.  
Exceptionally, papiers are more elaborate, especially for contract written with the help of an agent of 
the Ministry of Agriculture or of a sous-préfecture. The following example uses a standard 
formulation suggested by the agent of the sous-préfecture in charge of land issues, and makes explicit 
each partie’s share, the time the taker will have to maintain the plantation before sharing it, and the 
duration of the contract. It includes an original clause suggested by this agent in view of the conflicts 
caused by the questioning of P&S contracts by assignors’ relatives: 
Box 3. A Plant & Share papier (Aboisso) 
LAND MANAGEMENT CONTRACT 
Mister B. B., born in 1930 in TONKON, planter domiciled in KOHOUROU, recognized having transferred his 
plot of land of 09 ha 50 Ares, located in KOHOUROU sous-préfecture of Aboisso to Mister T. A. born on 
January 05, 1970 in KOHOUROU planter domiciliated in KOHOUROU 
Mister T. A. agrees to cultivate Hevea on the land of mister B. B. 
THE CLAUSES OF THE CONTRACT ARE THE FOLLOWING 
1. The sharing after planting will be done equitably: 04 ha 25 Ares; 
2. After the planting, the taker commits himself to maintain the entire planted parcel during five (05) years; 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 Solicited to get an attestation de plantation (a paper recognizing that a plantation exists) and realize a 
topographic plotting of the plantation.  
2 This practice shows that even in countries without a legally enforceable system of property rights, one can rely 
on such "informal contracts" to enforce (imperfectly) expectations and promises.  
3 The phrasing of these contracts respects the terminology of the French originals.  
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3. The duration of the contract is seventy (70) years from the date of the planting. 
Note: once the contract concluded, no termination can be contemplated before term. However, if due to the 
assignor or to his entitled relatives, it becomes impossible for the taker or his relatives to exploit the plantation 
for any reason, the assignor or his entitled relatives have to refund the taker or his relatives for all his expenses. 
                                                                                                                         Aboisso, May 23, 2005 
The taker        The assignor 
T. A.         B. B. 
Witnesses [three names and three signatures] 
[signatures authenticated by the sous-préfecture] 
In case of conflict, the actors usually appeal to village authorities (village chief, notables) or to 
customary authorities of a higher rank (such as the king’s court, in Akan country). If these recourses 
are unsuccessful, they present the case to the sous-préfet or to the gendarmerie (country side police 
force), whose intervention relates then to a type of "informal intervention of formal institutions", as it 
is not normally in their attribution to deal with contractual problems. Some sous-préfets have instituted 
conciliatory commissions aiming at searching for amicable agreements. Appealing to the court 
remains exceptional, due to the cost of the procedure, of its duration and of the uncertainty regarding 
the outcome. 
3.5 A demand for public intervention 
The survey showed the perception of the limits of the "informal formalization" ("The heirs often grab 
the strangers’ land because often all they have are these insignificant papers", Gban, Booda) and 
highlighted a real demand for the securization of P&S contracts: 92 % of people interviewed 
expressed the need for a public intervention in that matter, beyond the mere "validation" of the papiers 
by a public authority.   
The problems that might be avoided through public authority's provision and validation of some kind 
of model contract are of course directly related to the difficulties, real or expected, that we have just 
mentioned. Two main arguments are put forward by the actors: (i) such formal contracts would 
eliminate the tensions at plantation sharing by making the latter's conditions explicit; (ii) it would 
secure the taker’s rights (the main objective being to protect him from the contestation of the 
transaction by assignor’s relatives) as well as the assignor’s rights (by preventing land appropriation 
by the taker). More generally, a contract legalized by the state is seen as a credible device for conflict 
reduction. 
Other advantages of a formalization and legalization of the contracts are mentionned less frequently: 
clarification of the sharing or not of food crops initially associated with the young plantation; 
reduction of the delays in the planting or an unsatisfactory work investment of the taker; less conflict 
within assignors’ families by preventing transfers considered as illegitimate; elimination of 
contestation regarding the duration of the contract. 
Actors’ suggestions regarding the specific clauses to be made explicit reflect these sometimes 
contradictory expectations (we put in italics the clauses that come back most frequently).  
Some suggestions are made by assignors as well as by takers: 
• Each party’s share should be specified. 
• What will be shared should be specified: only the plantation, the plantation and the land, the 
production.  
• A third party (such as the agents of the Ministry of Agriculture) should be invited to 
implement the sharing of the plantation (if it is the plantation that is to be shared).  
• When the plantation does not succeed homogeneously, the sharing should ensure that that 
each one’s share includes a "good" and a "bad" part of it. This suggestion mostly comes from 
takers, but it is also formulated by assignors who see it as a way to reduce tensions: "What 
came out well and what came out with less success should be shared in the same way, because 
then it is good for everybody" (Gban, Booda). 
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• What food crops are allowed or not should be specified.  
• The right of the assignor to plant (or not) food crops on the plot, or to benefit from the taker’s 
production. 
• The taker's right to sell (or not) the plantation (plantation-sharing P&S contract). 
The takers insist particularly on the following clauses: 
• The contract should be signed before the work starts.  
• The name of each party’s heirs should be noted, and the contract should be signed in front of 
them. 
• The minutes of the assignor’s family council allowing the transaction to take place should be 
annexed to the contract, in order to reduce the risk of future contestation of the contract by 
assignor’s relatives.  
• The right of the taker’s heir on the plantation should be recognized and made explicit. 
• When there is an initial cash payment (such as in Damé), it should be mentioned in the 
contract.    
• The fact that once the plantation is shared, the taker no longer has any obligation towards the 
assignor, – making explicit the wish to move from tutorships to a mere contractual 
relationship. 
The assignors, on the other hand, ask for: 
• An explicit right to evict the taker from the plot if the work is not satisfactory;  
• An explicit prohibition, for the taker, to progressively renew the plantation. 
It is notable that the contract duration, the technical process involved in the creation of the plantation 
and the planning of the planting are never brought up as suggested clauses. As a matter of fact, the 
actors’ suggestions aim fundamentally at securing the rights transferred through a P&S contract, rather 
than reducing the uncertainty that affects the taker’s investment. 
4 P&S arrangements as incomplete contracts: a preliminary discussion 
The incompleteness of P&S contracts is not exceptional: incompleteness is the rule in real world 
contracting. From a Transaction Cost Theory perspective, incompleteness comes from bounded 
rationality, radical uncertainty and the complexity of the environment, which rule out any full 
anticipation of future contingencies (Brousseau & Glachant, 2002; Fares & Saussier, 2002). Those 
elements translate in high transaction costs incurred in accurately describing and writing all 
contractual feature ("ink costs") or going to court. The potential for exchange hazards is obvious if 
there is asset specificity, long-term investment, measurement difficulty and uncertainty, as a lock-in 
effect exposes the owners of specific assets to economic dependency and to his partner's opportunism 
(Williamson, 1985). P&S contracts organize production, i.e. the creation of resources, through long-
term1 site-specific investments. They illustrate what Ayres & Gertner (quoted by Hart & Moore, 1999) 
call "obligationally incomplete" contracts2, i.e. arrangements that do not fully specify the obligations 
of the parties and "leave a lot out", and that even fail to specify verifiable obligations of the parties 
(Bernheim & Whinston, 1998). Furthermore, these arrangements are at best "informally formalized" 
                                                 
1 Three to 5 years in plantation-and-land-sharing P&S, 25 to more than 50 years in production-sharing or 
plantation-sharing P&S. 
2 The Theory of Incomplete Contracts does not consider such contracts: "Some contracts are manifestly 
incomplete in the sense that they leave something out or are ambiguous. (…) Incompleteness like this is very 
common in reality, but unfortunately it is very hard to model. It would seem necessary to assume that the parties 
are boundedly rational in the sense that they do not foresee even relatively obvious events. In contrast, in this 
paper, we have assumed that the parties are constrained in contracting only by the fact that complicated states 
of nature cannot be verified. (…) the parties' obligations are fully specified in all circumstances" " (Hart & 
Moore, 1999:134). 
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through papiers whose content is largely deficient and without direct legal validity. P&S contracts 
evidently are not perfect-contingent-claim contracts!  
What interpretation can be given to this incompleteness? How to explain that actors (and specifically 
the takers) venture is such deals1? The empirical elements we have at hand allow us to bring forward 
some preliminary answers that will be mobilized as research intuitions in further research. 
We have identified four types of P&S contracts incompleteness:  
a) Incompleteness coming from uncertainty regarding property rights. This incompleteness may 
be exogenous to the bilateral contractual relationship (with the questioning of the contract by 
some assignor's relative). It may also be endogenous, with the risk of arbitrary eviction of the 
taker by the assignor, the (exceptional) lack of specification of what will be shared (only the 
plantation or the plantation and the land), the lack of specification of the assignor's rights 
regarding initial food crop production or regarding the taker's "duty of gratitude", the lack of 
specification of the taker's transfer right on the plantation (in plantation-sharing 
configurations). 
b) (Endogenous) incompleteness coming from the lack of specification regarding the specific 
investment: process of realization of the plantation, timing of the planting, concrete mode of 
plantation sharing. 
c) (Endogenous) incompleteness coming from the lack of anticipation of major events such as an 
accidental destruction of the plantation. 
d) (Endogenous) incompleteness coming from the lack of specification of the duration of the 
contract.  
The party potentially injured by incompleteness of type (b) is the assignor; in the other cases, it is 
mainly the taker - especially the non-autochthonous smallholder taker, in the current socio-political 
situation where non-autochthons' situation is quite shaky. If the taker is a cadre (especially a grand 
cadre), he might be in a less precarious position if he has links with public authorities, or even be in a 
position of strength. 
Yet, the P&S contract is not particularly complex and it should be possible to specify its most 
important clauses without much trouble, except in the case of the assignor's right to assign land under 
such arrangement, and of the taker's "duty of gratitude." The contract could easily specify beforehand, 
for instance, what is going to be shared (including or not the land itself), the assignor's rights regarding 
food crops, and what would happen to the contractual relationship in case of an accidental destruction 
of the plantation. The technical process followed for the creation of the plantation and the timing of 
the planting could also be made explicit in a schedule of conditions (type of seedlings, quantity and 
type of fertilizers and agro-chemicals, etc.). The time of the sharing and the length of the contract 
could be defined on the basis of simple indicators based on physical quantities of the product (such as 
"the plantation will be shared when the total production will reach x kilograms or tons", or  "the 
plantation will be considered as not any longer productive when production will come down under x 
kilograms or tons"). In practice however, actors do not proceed in that way, and this is the main puzzle 
that we try to resolve here. 
In the following discussion, it is important to keep in mind that P&S contracts relate an assignor who 
is most often an autochthon, and a taker who is most often a non-autochthon (Ivorian or foreigner) 
smallholder, but one who may also be a cadre (autochthonous or Ivorian from another region). These 
actors' profiles translate into strong potential differences in terms of human capital, labor and 
financing endowments, as well as in terms of position in the socio-political field. It is also important to 
adopt a dynamic perspective (Poppo & Zengler, 2002), on two accounts. First, as the P&S contract is a 
new institutional arrangement, most actors do not have experience regarding this arrangement and 
cannot refer back to a shared contractual framework. Second, the assignor might have no experience in 
the cultivation of the crop considered in the contract (hevea or oil palm) and therefore also lack critical 
technical knowledge – even the productive lifetime of a hevea plantation and the yields that might be 
                                                 
1 As we do not have currently adequate empirical data, we will not deal here with the issue of under-investment 
as a possible consequence of the combination of contract incompleteness, opportunism and asset specificity.  
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expected are generally ignored. One must thus anticipate the effects of future learning on contractual 
practices. 
We now discuss exogenous incompleteness rooted in uncertainty regarding property rights 
(endogenous incompleteness regarding property rights is dealt with in subsequent sections) and 
cognitive frames, we then focus on endogenous incompleteness, and conclude with a discussion of 
P&S arrangements as an extreme version of relational contracting. 
4.1 Incompleteness rooted in uncertainty regarding property rights 
Exogenous incompleteness coming from uncertainty about the right of the assignor to contract is not 
contemplated in economic theories of contracts, as property rights over the resources affected by the 
arrangement are assumed to be well-defined and enforced by both Incomplete Contract Theory as well 
as by the Transaction Costs Theory. And yet, this type of uncertainty is critically important here. 
This problem does not come from the informality of property rights as such: numerous studies have 
shown that customary land tenure can adequately secure land rights (Platteau, 1996; Lavigne Delville, 
1998; Deiniger & Binswanger, 2001; World Bank, 2003). However, in Southern Côte d'Ivoire, 
customary (or neo-customary) land systems have turned out clearly dysfunctionnal, in a context 
characterized by increased land pressure, by the monetarization of agricultural production and of 
access to land, and by the massive arrival of migrants. Tensions and countless conflicts between 
autochthons and settlers illustrate that dysfunction, especially regarding rights transferred to migrants. 
The questioning of a land transfer by assignors' relatives may come from a concern to keep the land 
for direct use by family members, but it can also correspond (as very often in the Centre-West, West 
and South-West) to an opportunist strategy of land or plantation grabbing in order to sell or resell it 
(including to their former users)1. The uncertainty over the right of the assignor to delegate rights, and 
its consequences for the migrants – which we underlined in the case of P&S contracts – are thus not 
specific to this contractual arrangement and concern as much, or even more, the "gifts" and "sales" of 
land rights (Colin & Ayouz, 2006; Chauveau & Colin, forthcoming). In this context, from the taker's 
standpoint, the risk of contestation of the assignor's right to delegate use rights on land can be likened 
to the risk of a "radical hold-up", in the Western-movies sense of the expression (the grabbing of the 
plantation). This risk highlights a type of indirect transaction cost (not rooted in the bilateral 
relationships as such) empirically well identifiable. 
The taker may try to secure his rights by trying to verify the extent and quality of the assignor' land 
rights. For that purpose, the best procedure would be the issuance of a minute of the assignor's family 
council attesting that the contract is known and accepted – we saw that this was the first measure 
expected by the takers from State intervention. Concretely however, only the "grands cadres" can 
impose such a procedure, thanks to the value, for the assignor, of contracting with such partners (who 
can develop oil palm and hevea plantations), and also thanks to the asymmetric socio-cultural and 
socio-political relationship they have with the smallholder assignors. Those cadres also systematically 
impose a topographic plotting by the agents of the Ministry of Agriculture, and usually also involve 
the sous-préfet in the contractual process. For the other types of takers (Ivorian or foreigner settlers), 
the right of the assignor to contract is essentially unverifiable, as the latter's intra-family relationships 
always remain a black box. To reduce uncertainty, however imperfectly, the taker has to rely on 
available information about the reputation of the assignor and of his family, on the presence of 
witnesses and on the issuance of a papier, once the plantation is shared (see infra).  
More importantly, the taker will try to keep as good a relationship as possible with the assignor, in 
order to be seen as a "good stranger," and therefore benefit from the assignor's (and notables') support 
in case the contract is contested by the assignor's relatives. For these actors, taking a plot under a P&S 
contract thus represents taking a sizable risk. Such a risk-taking strategy can be explained by the lack 
                                                 
1 We saw that the questioning of the taker's right may also come from the assignor's opportunistic behavior. Such 
a practice (for which we had echoes mainly in the Centre-West and South-West regions) may be above all 
explained by the fact that the assignor, in urgent need of cash, wants to sell the land or the plantation. He has 
otherwise no interest in chasing the taker, because he would have then to take charge of the work, or to find 
laborers with all transaction costs induced (whereas these landowners look typically for a rentier position). 
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of alternatives they face and by the fact that they mostly invest domestic labor, when P&S contracts 
concern a cocoa plantation.  
4.2 Plant & Share contracts as new contractual devices: the role of cognitive frames 
Incompleteness may come from the fact that boundedly rational partners just do not anticipate some 
contingencies or even the future stages of the long-term contractual relationship (Macauley, 1963; 
Bernheim & Whinston, 1998) – all the more so since the contractual relationships is in relatively early 
stages of development, as is the case for P&S arrangements. In the terms of a Kroumen who assigned 
land under a P&S contract in Tabou, discussing about the length of the arrangement: "These are things 
that I have not considered. Right now, we are just at the beginning of the contract." Similarly, for 
Burkinabè settler in San Pédro region, "The challenge for the migrant is to get land to plant cocoa. He 
does not take into account all the problems which may arise later on." Perhaps much of the fuzziness 
that has initially characterized the object of the sharing (the land and the plantation, or only the 
plantation), can be traced to this type of determinants of incompleteness. 
One can also interpret as the result of a learning process the fact that the increasingly precise 
specification of some contractual terms (such as the timing of the planting) or the introduction of 
contractual devices aiming at overcoming agency problems. A good illustration can be found in the 
spatial organization of the planting and the sharing. In plantation-sharing contracts, two systems are 
used. In one system, the taker creates two plantations on two different plots, one for the assignor and 
one for himself. This system, which contains the seeds of an under-investment of the taker on the 
assignor's plot1, seems to have characterized in some regions the initial contracts but now appears to 
be falling into disuse. The norm today is rather that the taker creates a plantation on a single plot with 
the assignor choosing his part when production starts and the plantation is shared. 
4.3 Endogenous incompleteness  
The elements of incompleteness now considered correspond to issues that are clearly perceived, albeit 
rarely explicited, by the actors involved. Economic theories of contracts trace this type of 
incompleteness to the fact that contracting parties use noncontingent contracts and fail to specify 
obligations in unlikely states of the world to save on transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). They lower 
the "ink costs" of fully contingent contracts, the search and negotiation costs involved in specifying a 
large number of unlikely possibilities, or the prohibitive measurement costs in assessing performance 
so that a breach can be demonstrated to a third-party enforcer (Brousseau, 1993; Brousseau & 
Glachant, 2002; Klein, 2002). Our analysis of P&S contracts largely supports this view but also points 
to other factors as sources of incompleteness. 
4.3.1 Fuzziness as a strategy of tension reduction and relationship maintenance 
More precision in the conditions of the coordination is often felt to reduce the risks of tensions. 
Conversely, however, actors may instead (often?) view the search for full clarification of contractual 
terms as costly in relational terms. One might indeed create more rather than less problems by trying 
to envision in detail all potential conflictive issues. In other words, in the actors' perception, it may 
always be possible to solve problems as they emerge over time, and more more advantageous, in the 
short-term, to reachan agreement by avoiding any subject perceived as delicate – such as the concrete 
mode of plantation sharing, the taker's transfer rights, the assignor's rights regarding food crops. Such 
an outlook could also explain why takers seldom exert pressures to quickly get a papier. This type of 
incompleteness is thus anchored in a relational conception of the contractual relationship (see infra). 
Macaulay (1963:64) had already mentioned such a rationale in business relations in the U.S.:  
"Detailed negotiated contracts can get in the way of creating good exchange relationships between 
business units. If one side insists on a detailed plan, there will be delay (…). In some cases they may not 
be able to agree at all (…) and as a result a sale may be lost to the seller and the buyer may have to 
search elsewhere for an acceptable supplier. (…) Such planning indicates a lack of trust and blunts the 
demands of friendship, turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse trade."  
                                                 
1 It can be noticed that this potential under-investment was (is) coming from the spatial organization of the 
contractual relationships, rather than from a risk of hold-up (in the economic sense of the word).  
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The lack of clarification of some points may also come from the fact that the bilateral relationship is 
such that one of the actors (the potentially the injured party, typically the taker) considers that it would 
be completely out of order for the taker to ask his to ask the assignor, because he is also his tutor, to 
make every clause explicit. 
4.3.2 Strategic incompleteness  
Because it is enmeshed with tutorship, the incompleteness may also be somehow imposed on taker and 
sought by the assignor. This leads to what could be called strategic incompleteness, in the sense that 
fuzziness may be instrumentalized, especially when one of the actors is not in a position to ask for 
more explicit clauses. Strategic incompleteness may well explain (in parallel to other, non 
opportunistic, reasons, see infra) the delays imposed by the assignors in the issuance of papiers. 
4.3.3 Uncertainty & flexibility 
Under radical uncertainty, excessive specification of the contract may create rigidities. As stated by 
Macaulay (1963:64): 
"(…) carefully planned arrangements may create undesirable exchange relationships between business 
units. (…) the greater danger perceived by some businessmen is that one would have to perform his side 
of the bargain to its letter and thus lose what is called "flexibility." Businessmen may welcome a measure 
of vagueness in the obligations they assume so that they may negotiate matters in light of the actual 
circumstances."  
In other words, increased specification in long-term contractual relations creates rigidity. The trade-off 
between opportunism and adaptation has been well explored by the Economics of contracts: general 
contractual terms might favor ex post adaptation of contractual terms after certain contingency is 
realized, while at the same time increasing the risk of opportunistic behavior (Nicita & Pagano, 2005). 
The clause relatives to the duration of the P&S contract – the determination of the time when the taker 
will have to restitute the land to the assignor – best illustrates this point. We saw that the rule is "When 
the plantation ceases to produce", or "does not produce enough any longer." Due to agro-ecological 
factors, it is not possible to determine this term ex ante for any of the crops considered (hevea, cocoa 
or oil palm tree, even if in the latter case the margin of uncertainty is much reduced). It should be 
noted that the sources of uncertainty here do not lie in impredictable exogenous shocks, but in bio-
technical considerations1. 
The usual absence of an ex ante definition of the timing of the planting may also be explained by the 
actors' awareness that events independent of the taker's work may delay the realization of the 
plantation – a planting does not always succeed and sometimes it has to be renewed. The risk for the 
assignor that this lack of specification may induce the taker to delay the planting is reduced by the 
shared interest in an early production start, and also by his postponing the issuance of the papier 
(which is supposed to secure the taker's rights) until the sharing of the plantation, i.e. by the latent 
threat of eviction "if he really drags things out too much ." 
"Often the problem when we do Plant & Share is the taker does not develop the land, he drags things out 
and even gives up. What would you do if you have already given him a papier?" (Gban assignor, Booda). 
One find here two classical responses envisioned by Transaction Costs Theory to contractual problems 
raised by contractual incompleteness: taking hostages (Williamson, 1985) – if we interpret as such the 
delay in the issuance of the papier, and threatening termination of the business relationship for non-
performance of the unwritten contractual understanding (Klein, 2002: 62). 
4.3.4 Monitoring and enforcement costs  
Contractual incompleteness may also be related to the monitoring costs that would be incurred if the 
contractual clauses were fully specified and enforced. This factor undoubtedly plays for those of the 
assignors – and they are numerous – who are fundamentally in a rentier rationale and who rarely visit 
the parcels (which can be far away from the village). According to our survey, one out of two 
landowners do not intervene at all at the time of the establishment of the plantation, and when they do, 
                                                 
1 Another option that we will consider later would be the introduction of some simple quantitative indicator. 
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it is usually just to prohibit intercropping with cassava, not to keep an eye on/survey/monitor the 
planting process. 
Determining a precise planting schedule would imply a follow-up by the assignor. The imprecision of 
the general clause "we will share the plantation at the time production starts" might be removed by 
introducing some simple quantitative indicator ("we will share when the production will reach x 
kilograms"), but then the assignor would expose himself to risk of fraud from the taker and would 
have to exercise a time-consuming control. The same can be said regarding a simple quantitative 
indicator that could be used to determine the term of the contract (e.g., "you will get the land back 
when production will go down to x kilograms"). Rather than establishing such indicators, the actors 
rely on what they see as shared norms (see infra). 
The risk of takers' opportunistic behavior during the establishment of the plantation (under-investment 
in the assignors' future share of the plantation) and the potential monitoring costs that its reduction 
implies are greatly reduced by the way most plantation are created today (see supra), with the planting 
of only one parcel, the sharing of that parcel at the time when production starts, and the selection by 
the assignor of his share of the plantation. 
"In Plant & Share arrangements, if the plots are not together, the one who does the planting has no 
motivation to work on the landlord's plot. As we do now where is the same plot that we will share, the 
work is well done" (Kroumen, Ménéké).  
Delaying the issuance of the papier reduces the risk of excessively dragging the planting out, but also 
constitutes a kind of test of the technical ability of the taker: 
"I have not yet given him a papier because I am waiting to see how he works" (Agni, Damé).  
Symmetrically, the lack of papier is sometimes explained by the fact that the taker does not ask for it, 
waiting for the success of the planting: 
"I have not yet asked for a papier because there are too much dead cocoa trees, I am ashamed to go to my 
landowner to make a papier" (Baoulé, Damé). 
4.3.5 Asymmetries in human capital endowments 
In the case of P&S contracts for hevea (and sometimes oil palm tree) cultivation, the assignor's 
frequent lack of competence prevents the full specification of contractual terms in a schedule of 
conditions for the establishment of the plantation. This is clearly an issue of human capital endowment 
and not of bounded rationality or transaction costs. The assignor has to rely on the taker's presumed 
ability and on the presumption of converging interests. There is of course a risk of adverse selection. 
The contractual device consisting in the sharing of just one planted parcel and the assignor's choice of 
his share satisfactorily deals with the risk of moral hazard regarding the investment by the taker. 
4.3.6 Complexity  
Even if there is no deficiency in assignors' technical abilities (as in the case of cocoa production), the 
question remains of what is a "good" plantation, i.e. a satisfactory taker's work. A simple criterion 
such as yields cannot be utilized as yields depend on the conditions of the realization of the plantation, 
but also on its maintenance once production starts. Such an evaluation cannot rely on a numerical 
measure of quality but instead on the actors' pattern recognition, i.e. on the subjective evaluations of 
the acceptability of performance (MacLeold, 2002). 
4.3.7 Common knowledge  
Common knowledge may dispense with the requirement to formally describe the criteria defining 
certain characteristics or behavior as "standard" or "fair" (Brousseau & Glachant, 2002) – what 
Macauley (1963) labeled mutual but tacit understanding about an issue, which might remain 
unmentioned in negotiations1. Common knowledge of course intervenes mostly in P&S contracts for 
cocoa plantations, regarding contractual elements such as "we will share the plantation once the 
                                                 
1 In the French traditional tenancy practices, a usual contractual term is that the tenant commits himself to 
cultivate "as a good father should". 
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production starts", the lack of a schedule of conditions for the realization of the plantation, or a 
contractual term defined as "when the production stops."   
"The length of the contract, it is hard to say, but we will both know it will be the time" (Agni assignor, 
Aniassué).  
The fact that the actors do not feel it necessary to clearly define their contractual commitment because 
of this perception of converging expectations nevertheless open the way to tensions or conflicts 
regarding the term of the arrangement, grounded or not in actors' opportunism (there may be good 
faith in diverging appreciation of the norm "the taker will give back the land when the plantation will 
not any longer produce enough"). 
4.4 A relational governance of contractual relationships  
The P&S arrangement can be seen as an extreme version (in terms of incompleteness) of relational 
contracting, i.e. of business-oriented contracting embedded in social relationships and grounded in 
values and agreed-upon processes found in social relationships (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1978, 
2000). In Furubotn & Richter's terms: 
"Relational contracts can be understood as contracts that do not try to take account of all future 
contingencies but are nevertheless long-term arrangements in which past, present, and expected future 
personal relations among the contractual parties matters (Macneil, 1974, 753). Therefore, such contracts 
are, to a degree, implicit, informal, and nonbinding. Self-enforcement, in a concrete sense, plays an 
important role here. Actually, most transactions concluded under relational contracting are more or less 
firmly embedded in a structure of relations that transcends the discrete transaction" (Furubotn et Richter, 
2005:173). 
Furubotn & Richter's quote of Hadfield (1990) is also illuminating and fits quite well with the P&S 
contract case: 
"(…) incomplete contracts often exist deeply embedded in an ongoing relationship. The parties are not 
strangers; much of their interaction takes place “off the contract”, mediated not by visible terms 
enforceable by a court, but by a particular balance of cooperation and coercion, communication and 
strategy." 
A relational perspective highlights contextualization as the key factor for the understanding of the 
contractual relationship, and implies that one examines, beyond the sole contract, the relations in 
which that relationship is embedded (Macneil, 1985)1. We will not discuss here the issue of whether 
relational contracting is purposefully enacted in order to minimize transaction costs and provide 
flexibility in the contractual relationships as compared to more complete contracts, or if it would be 
better seen as a by-product of the general working of the social matrix. What is nevertheless evident is 
the well-recognized role played by the expectations of pay-offs from future cooperative behavior in 
encouraging cooperative behavior. 
The relational dimension of P&S contracts allows the development of this arrangement in conditions 
of major incompleteness (and contribute to explain this incompleteness), but its efficiency in terms of 
opportunistic-behavior prevention and conflict avoidance is not guaranteed, as we saw. The principle 
according to which "we will always manage to work out things in case of trouble" quickly finds its 
limits when one of the actors (or both) manifests opportunistic proclivities (which can be related to a 
high discount rate). 
4.5 Mapping the incompleteness of Plant & Share contracts  
The key elements of incompleteness that have been sketched out can be synthesized using the 
dimensions of the contractual relationship proposed by Macaulay (1963:57): 
                                                 
1 Macneil (2000:888-892) distinguish his own relational approach from a transaction costs approach by the fact 
that his own starts "from an overall grasp of the essential relations of which the transactions are an integral 
part", whereas transaction costs analysis starts by looking at the transaction alone. He nevertheless recognizes 
that "such a process carried out with the utmost of thoroughness would ultimately result in uncovering all 
significant aspects of the enveloping relations and their interplay with the transactions being studied". 
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• the type of issues dealt with through the contract: the definition of the performances (what 
each is expected to do or to refrain from doing), the effects of contingencies, the effect of 
defective performance, and their agreement that the contract be legally enforceable (in our 
case, this point just corresponds to the production of an informal papier); 
• the degree of planning by the parties: the contractual terms may carefully and explicitly 
planned; there may be a mutual but tacit understanding about an issue; the actors may have 
two inconsistent unexpressed assumptions about an issue; or they may never have thought of 
the issue. 
In the context of our study, the issue of rights and duties has also to be included. 
Tableau 6. Mapping the incompleteness of P&S contracts  
 Rights & obligations 
Definition of 
performance 
Effect of 
contingencies
Effect of 
defective 
performance 
"Legal" sanctions 
Explicit 
Realization of a 
plantation by the 
taker, with a 
specified perennial 
crop. 
Sharing when 
production starts 
% of each party 
Contract duration: 
"until the plantation 
stop producing 
enough" 
Area to plant 
 
- - 
Papier as a device 
to secure the 
existence of the 
contract (rather 
than its content) 
Tacit agreement - What is a "good plantation" - - - 
Between explicit 
& tacit agreement 
If plantation-
sharing: the land 
remains the 
property of the 
assignor 
Planning of the 
planting (length of 
time taken by the 
realization of the 
plantation) 
- - - 
Between explicit 
& unilateral 
assumptions 
What is to be 
shared (plantation, 
or plantation and 
land?) 
- - - - 
Between tacit 
agreement & 
unilateral 
assumptions 
Assignor's right to 
assign land  
Concrete mode of 
plantation sharing 
Taker's transfer 
rights  
Assignor's rights 
regarding food 
crops 
Taker's duty of 
gratitude 
What is a plantation 
that "started to 
produce" 
What is a plantation 
that "no longer 
produces" 
 
- 
 
Taker's eviction 
if the planting is 
excessively 
delayed if it 
blatantly fails  
Postponing the 
issuance of the 
papier in order to 
mitigate risks of 
excessively 
dragging out the 
planting or of 
realizing a "poor" 
plantation 
Between 
unawareness of the 
issue & unilateral 
assumptions 
- - 
What would 
happen if the 
plantation is 
accidentally 
destroyed 
- - 
5 Conclusion: the Plant & Share contract as part of a way out for Côte 
d'Ivoire?  
Aside from a clearly perceived conflictive potential induced by its incompleteness on some contractual 
clauses, P&S is viewed by most actors (including local State authorities) as a new contractual device 
that might contribute to a reduction of conflicts in rural areas and to an lessening of the tensions 
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between autochthons and "strangers." P&S contracts are indeed always contemplated as a promising 
alternative to the highly conflictive land sales. 
With plantation- or production-sharing P&S contracts, the autochthons maintain their ownership right 
on land and this avoids the major source of conflict. Furthermore, while incompleteness in land "sales" 
bears on the central issue of ownership rights transfer from the seller to the buyer, in plantation- and 
production-sharing P&S contracts it bears on what the actors see as much less sensitive issues such as 
the conditions of the establishment of the plantation.   
P&S contracts are felt by autochthons and migrants to be reasonable compromises as they enable 
landowners who do not have the labor, financing resources, or willingness to develop their land to 
benefit from the taker's investment1. As expressed quite explicitly by a Burkinabé who settled in San 
Pédro region: "The autochthons give us plots under Plant and Share contracts because they have no 
labor force, no equipment, no financial resources, and above all because they do not like working in 
the fields." A key positive feature of P&S contracts is the perception that it represents an equitable 
deal, especially with half-and-half sharing arrangements, an impression clearly and frequently 
conveyed by statements such as: "After 4 years, there will be an equitable sharing of the plantation" 
(Agni autochthon, Aboisso); and "The sharing is done equitatively" (Guéré autochthon, Duekué). The 
key question that remains is the possible evolution in this perception of equity of P&S contracts.  
 
 
                                                 
1 As such, P&S arrangements are also seen as possible alternative to the long-term lease contract, which is 
supposed to secure the use rights of foreigners who acquired land in the past. 
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